How Fiscal Decentralization Flattens Progressive Taxes by Hodler, Roland & Schmidheiny, Kurt
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a
? 
13
1.
15
2.
21
1.
59
 F
ri,
 0
2 
M
ar
 2
01
8 
11
:1
4:
16
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 M
oh
r S
ie
be
ck
FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis vol. 62 no. 2 281
How Fiscal Decentralization Flattens Progressive Taxes
Roland Hodler and Kurt Schmidheiny*
Received 11 November 2005; in revised form 6 April 2006; accepted 4 May 2006
We study the tension between fiscal decentralization and progressive taxation. We
present a multi-community model in which households differ in incomes and housing
preferences and in which the local income tax rate is a function of an exogenous pro-
gressive tax schedule and an endogenous local tax multiplier. The progression of the
tax schedule induces a self-sorting process that results in substantial though imperfect
income sorting. Considering this income sorting, the resulting tax schedule is less pro-
gressive than the exogenous tax schedule. Empirical evidence from the largest Swiss
metropolitan area supports the predictions of our model.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we study the tension between fiscal decentralization and pro-
gressive taxation. We investigate to what extent fiscal decentralization re-
duces the progression of a common tax schedule in a federation in which
communities can set the level of taxation. We find that progressive taxation
and fiscal decentralization lead to income sorting, which reduces the pro-
gression of the tax schedule.
We base our analysis on a multi-community model, in which the income
tax rate is a functionof an exogenous progressive tax schedule andanendoge-
nous local tax multiplier. Local tax revenue is used to finance a local good. In
the basic version of the model, the mobile individual households differ only
in their incomes. In equilibrium, no household wants to move, local housing
markets clear, and the communities’ budgets are balanced. It follows that the
local tax multipliers must be higher in communities in which housing prices
are lower. The progressionof the tax schedule then induces a self-sorting pro-
cess that results in perfect income sorting. Poor households locate in high-tax
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Schelker, and participants at the Public Choice Society Meeting, the European Public
Choice Society Meeting, and the Norwegian–German Seminar in Public Economics for
helpful comments.
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communities, while rich households locate in low-tax communities. Different
from the previous literature,1 sorting is explained by the progression of the
tax schedule and does not require strong assumptions on the preferences for
either public goods or housing. While some degree of income sorting is ob-
served in reality, this sorting is never perfect (see, e.g., Epple and Sieg, 1999,
Hardman and Ioannides, 2004, and Ioannides, 2004). A potential reason for
imperfect income sorting is that households differ in their preferences. We
therefore add heterogeneity in the households’ preferences to our model. In
particular, we assume heterogeneity in the preferences for housing. As each
household’s location choice depends now on its income and its preferences,
the income sorting is imperfect in equilibrium: households with the same
income are found in different communities, though rich households are still
more likely to locate in low-tax communities than poor households.
Tax progression – measured as liability progression – is in our setup in-
dependent of the tax multiplier and therefore constant across communities.
In equilibrium, rich households avoid high tax rates by moving to low-tax
communities. Considering income sorting, themean tax schedule is therefore
shown to be less progressive than the tax schedule in any given community.
The mean tax schedule depicts the tax rates as faced by the households as
a function of income.
To illustrate the implications of this model, we calibrate a fully speci-
fied version to the Zurich area, the largest Swiss metropolitan area. Swiss
metropolitan areas offer an excellent laboratory for the analysis of fiscal
decentralization. In Switzerland, each community can individually set the
level of income taxes by a local tax multiplier, while the cantons (states) fix
the (progressive) schedule of income taxes. The equilibrium values of this
simulation show the same pattern across communities as we observe in the
Zurich area: Rich households locate mainly, but not exclusively, in commu-
nities with low tax multipliers, and poor households mainly in communities
with high tax multipliers.
We then use data on the spatial distribution of incomes in the Zurich area
to estimate the mean tax schedule in this area. We find that the mean tax
schedule is less progressive than the tax schedule implementedby the canton,
because rich households are more likely to live in low-tax communities than
poor households. This finding is in line with the predictions of our theoretical
model. The observed differences in taxes and housing prices are, however,
small compared to the results of our calibrated model. We argue that the tax
equalization programs of the canton of Zurich could account for some of
these differences.
1 See, e.g., Ellickson (1971), Westhoff (1977), Epple and Romer (1991), and the literature
surveyed in Ross and Yinger (1999).
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This paper is most closely related to Feldstein and Wrobel (1998), Epple
and Platt (1998), and Schmidheiny (2006a). Feldstein and Wrobel (1998)
show that a shift in a single U.S. state’s tax progression has no redistribu-
tive effects, since migration leads to an adjustment of the net wages and
the employment structure. Complementarily, we show that location choices
undermine the redistributive effect of progressive taxation in the presence
of fiscal decentralization even if wages do not adjust. Epple and Platt (1998)
include preference heterogeneity as we do, but study local property tax-
ation rather than local income taxation. Schmidheiny (2006a) estimates the
location-choice part of our model but does not analyze its equilibrium prop-
erties.
More generally, our paper relates to the literature on fiscal federalism.2
It is a well-known normative principle of this literature that income redistri-
bution should be centralized. As progressive income taxes are a particular
means to redistribute income, it directly follows that “progressive income
taxation [...] – if substantial in scope –must be uniform within the entire area
over which there is a high degree of capital and labor mobility” (Musgrave,
1971, p. 7). In this paper, we provide some support for this view by showing
that fiscal decentralization does indeed undermine the progression of the
tax schedule. However, we also find theoretical and empirical evidence that
the income sorting of the population does not completely offset progres-
sion, hence leaving room for substantial redistribution through progressive
income taxation at the local level.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes fiscal de-
centralization and progressive taxation in Switzerland and some other coun-
tries with comparable tax systems. Section 3 presents the theoretical model
and some results concerning the agents’ location choice. It further proves
that an (asymmetric) equilibrium exists. Section 4 presents the simulation
of a fully specified version of our model, which is calibrated to the Zurich
metropolitan area. Section 5 estimates the mean tax schedule faced by the
households in this area. Section 6 concludes.
2. Fiscal Decentralization and Progressive Taxation in
Switzerland (and Elsewhere)
Switzerland is an exemplary federal fiscal system. The Swiss federation com-
prises 26 states, the so-called cantons. The cantons are divided into roughly
3000 municipalities of varying size and population. All three state levels
finance their expenditures essentially by their own taxes and fees. 46% of
the total tax revenue is collected by the federation, 32% by the cantons, and
2 For a recent survey of this literature see Oates (1999).
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22% by the municipalities.3 While the federal government is mainly financed
by indirect taxes (61% of federal tax revenue) such as the VAT, the cantons
andmunicipalities largely rely on direct taxes. Income taxes account for 60%
of cantonal and 84% of municipal tax revenue.
The cantons organize their tax systems autonomously. For example, they
decide upon the level of income and corporate taxes and the degree of tax
progression. The individual municipalities in turn can set a tax multiplier for
income and corporate taxes. The municipal tax is then the cantonal tax rate
multiplied by the municipal tax multiplier. Federal and cantonal systems
of fiscal equalization limit the tax differences across cantons and across
municipalities within the same canton to some extent, but still leave room
for considerable variation.
The above-outlined federal system leads to substantial differences of in-
come taxes across Swiss municipalities. For example, for a two-child family
with a gross income of 80,000 Swiss francs (CHF), combined cantonal and
municipal income taxes ranged from 3.6% to 11.3% in the year 1997 (and its
federal income tax was 0.7%). With an income of 500,000 CHF a two-child
family faced much higher tax rates due to the progression of the tax sched-
ules. Combined cantonal and municipal income taxes ranged from 10.9%
to 28.7%4 for this household (and its federal income tax was 9.4%). Within
metropolitan areas the (municipality) tax differences are smaller, but they
still differ by a factor of 1.5 in, e.g., the Zurich area.
While local taxation of property is widespread, especially in the United
States, local taxation of income is rarer. Local income taxation at the mu-
nicipal level is, e.g., observed in four U.S. states (Indiana, Maryland, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania) and in Denmark. In contrast with the progressive local
tax scheme in Switzerland, these states and countries apply a flat local tax.
Belgium is to our knowledge the only country with a similar system of fiscal
decentralization at municipal level to that of Switzerland. In Belgium, each
of the three regions – Flanders,Wallonia, and the Brussels Regionl – collects
progressive income taxes. Furthermore, each municipality can generate its
own income tax revenue by adding a fixed percentage surcharge on the (pro-
gressive) regional income tax. Canada had a similar system at the provincial
level between 1977 and 1996 (see Boadway and Kitchen, 1980): Personal
income taxes in Canadian provinces (except Quebec) were a percentage of
the (progressive) federal tax.
3 All figures in this paragraph apply to 2001. Source: Swiss Federal Tax Administra-
tion (2002), Öffentliche Finanzen der Schweiz 2001, Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical
Office.
4 Note, however, that this high tax rate is rather hypothetical, as it is very unlikely to find
a household with such high income in one of the very high-tax municipalities.
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Tax competition is often constrained by tax equalization programs. This is
also the case in Switzerland. In the canton of Zurich, as an example, there
are horizontal and vertical tax equalization programs that limit the tax (mul-
tiplier) competition among communities: First, there is a program that redis-
tributes tax revenues from the communities with the highest per capita tax
bases to those with the lowest. Second, the canton of Zurich subsidizes the
communities with the highest taxmultipliers.The aggregate support for com-
munities with low tax bases and high tax multipliers was about 200 million
Swiss francs in 1999. In addition, the city of Zurich, which does not partici-
pate in these tax equalizationprograms, receivedcantonal payments of about
130 million Swiss francs.5 As described above, the observed tax differentials
are, despite these equalization programs, substantial in the Zurich area.
3. The Model
In this section, we introduce and solve the model. After presenting the
general setting, we characterize the preferences and derive the resulting
allocation of households across distinct communities. We then prove the
existence of an asymmetric equilibrium, and we introduce heterogeneity in
the households’ preferences. Finally, we discuss how the resulting segregation
affects the tax schedule and its progression.
3.1. The Setting
There is a metropolitan area with two communities i = 1, 2 of given land
area Li.6 The area is populated by a continuum of households, which differ
in their income y ∈ [y, y]. Income follows a density function f (y) > 0.
There are three goods in the economy: private consumption b, housing h,
and a publicly provided local good g. The housing h is provided by absentee
landlords, and housing markets are competitive. In each community i, the
price of housingpi equates the housing supplyHSi with the aggregate housing
demandHDi. We assume that the housing supplyHSi = HS(Li,pi, ) is a non-
decreasing function of land area Li and housing price pi.
Each community i spends the amount nig to provide the local good g,
where ni is the share of households living in community i. The commu-
nities levy income taxes to finance the local good. In each community i,
the tax rate consists of two parts, a local tax multiplier ti and a tax sched-
ule r(y) > 0, which is continuous and progressive, i.e., r′(y) > 0. Total taxes
are thus Ti(y) = tir(y)y for a household with income y, the average tax
5 Source: Canton of Zurich (2000), Bestandesaufnahme des Finanzausgleichs des Kantons
Zürichs.
6 The restriction to two communities is made for simplicity.
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rate is Ti(y)/y = tr(y) ∈ [0, 1), and the marginal tax rate is ∂Ti(y)/∂y =
ti[r(y) + y r′(y)] ∈ [0, 1). The tax schedule r(y) is exogenous (to the com-
munities) and the same in both communities.
The progressionof the tax rate can bemeasured as the liability progression
(see Musgrave and Thin, 1948). The liability progression is the elasticity of
total taxes with respect to income:
ρi(y) := ∂Ti(y)
∂y
y
Ti(y)
= r(y) + y r
′(y)
r(y)
> 1 . (1)
Note that the liability progression is independent of the tax multiplier ti and
therefore the same in both communities: ρi(y) = ρ(y) for i = 1, 2.7
We assume that the local good g is fixed and identical across commu-
nities. In each community i, the tax multiplier ti is therefore determined
by budget balance. There are two reasons for assuming exogeneity of the
local good. First, the local good g can be thought as a locally provided,
locally financed, but centrally decided good. We think that many locally fi-
nanced goods, particularly in Switzerland, satisfy this description. Schooling,
for example, accounts for the largest item in municipal budgets in Switzer-
land; local neighborhood schools are locally provided and locally financed;
however, cantonal regulation leaves little discretionary power for financially
relevant decisions.8 Our model focuses therefore on the revenue side of fis-
cal decentralization. Second, we think that the progression of income taxes
is a very important factor for income sorting in Switzerland. However, our
m del would become intractable if we allowed for both progressive taxation
and endogenous provision of local goods.9
Further, we assume that each household can move costlessly and chooses
the community maximizing its utility as place of residence.
3.2. Preferences and Location Choice
The preferences of the households are described by the utility function
U(h, b) , (2)
7 Of course, the liability progression would also be equal to ρ(y) in the case of full tax
equalization across communities.
8 In particular, teachers’ salaries and class size are regulated by cantonal law. Furthermore,
cantonal courts have ruled, based on equity considerations, that schools (in rich neighbor-
hoods) are not allowed to provide additional tutoring or extra classes for extraordinarily
strong or weak pupils.
9 Schmidheiny (2006b) studies endogenous local goods determined in municipal majority
votes, but financed by flat local income taxes. His model predicts qualitatively the same
equilibrium situation as the model presented in this paper: rich households locate in low-
tax communities with high housing prices while the poor prefer low-price communities
with high taxes. The provision of local public goods is slightly higher in the rich low-tax
community.
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where h is the consumption of housing and b the consumption of the private
good.10 We assume the utility function to be strictly increasing, strictly quasi-
concave, and twice continuously differentiable in h and b.
Households face the budget constraint (omitting community indices)
ph + b ≤ yd = y[1 − t · r(y)] , (3)
where p is the price of housing; the price of the private good is set to unity.
Disposable income yd depends on the local tax multiplier t and the tax rate
schedule r(y).
Maximization of the utility function (2) with respect to h and b subject
to the constraint (3) yields the housing demand h∗ = h(p, yd) = h(t, p, y),
demand for the private good b∗ = y(1 − t) − ph(t, p, y), and indirect utility
V(t, p, y) = U(h∗, b∗) . (4)
For later use note that V is continuous in t, p, and y.
We assume that the elasticity of housing with respect to the disposable
income is smaller than or equal to unity, i.e.,
εh,yd :=
∂h∗
∂yd
yd
h∗
≤ 1 for all yd and p. (5)
The assumption of income elasticity of housing demand below 1 is well sup-
ported by the large empirical literature on housing demand. Mayo’s (1981)
seminal survey of empirical studies using microdata reports consistent in-
come elasticity below 1. This result is robust, controlling for housing prices,
demographic household variables (e.g., Mayo, 1981; Hansen, Formby, and
Smith, 1998), tenure choice (e.g., Henderson and Ioannides 1986; Hansen,
Formby, and Smith, 1998), and functional form (Hansen, Formby, and Smith,
1996). The assumption is also supported by the Swiss data used in the cali-
bration of our model.
Next, we present two properties of the households’ indifference curves
that will lead to segregation of the population by incomes:
Property 1
M(t, p, y) := dt
dp
∣∣∣∣
dV=0
= − ∂V/∂p
∂V/∂t
= − h
∗
y · r(y) < 0.
Property 1 follows from the strictly increasing utility function after apply-
ing the implicit-function theorem and the envelope theorem. It implies that
a household can be made indifferent towards an increase in the tax mul-
tiplier t when it is compensated by decreased housing prices p, and vice
versa.
10 Since the local good g is constant across communities and not of primary interest for
our considerations, we assume for simplicity that it does not enter the utility function.
Equivalently, we could assume that it enters separably.
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Property 2
∂M
∂y
=
[
1 − εh,yd
∂yd
∂y
y
yd
]
h∗
y2r(y)
+ ∂r(y)
∂y
h∗
yr2(y)
> 0 for all y, t, and p.
Proof. By assumption, εh,yd ≤ 1. Our assumptions about the bounds of the
average and the marginal tax rate guarantee (∂yd/∂y)(y/yd) = [1 − tr
−tyr′(y)]/[1 − tr(y)] ∈ [0, 1). The assumption that r(y) increases in y, im-
plying ∂r(y)/∂y > 0, concludes the proof. 
Property 2, which is key for the subsequent results, implies that the de-
crease in housing prices p that compensates a household for a higher tax
multiplier t has to be larger for rich households than for poor ones. The rea-
son is that poor households care weakly more about housing prices p than
rich households because εh,yd ≤ 1, while rich households caremore about the
tax multiplier t because of the progression of the tax schedule, i.e., r′(y) > 0.
Note that due to the progression of the tax schedule, property 2 even holds
with homothetic preferences, i.e., in the case of εh,yd = 1.11
Given a set of community characteristics, (pi, ti) for i = 1, 2, a household
with income y prefers to live in community i if and only if
V(pi, ti, y) ≥ V(pj, tj, y) . (6)
From this, the following proposition directly follows. We assume with no
loss of generality that t1 > t2.
Proposition 1 (Order of community characteristics) If both communities are pop-
ulated and if (p1, t1) = (p2, t2) with t1 > t2, then community 1 with the higher tax rate
t1 > t2 must have lower housing prices p1 < p2 than community 2.
Proof. Suppose the opposite, i.e., p1 ≥ p2 and t1 > t2. In this case, no house-
hold would prefer to live in 1 (for the same reason that leads to property 1).
This is a contradiction. 
In the remaining part of this section, we show how households allocate
themselves across the two communities when the communities differ in their
housing prices pi and their tax multipliers ti.
Lemma 1 (Boundary indifference) There is a border household that is indifferent
between the two communities. That is, if a household with income y′ prefers to live
in community i and a household with income y′′ > y′ in community j, then there ex-
ists a border household with income yˆ, y′ ≤ yˆ ≤ y′′, that is indifferent between the
two communities.
Proof. Ahousehold with y′ prefers i to j; hence V(pi, ti,y′) − V(pj, tj,y′) ≥ 0.
The opposite is true for a household with y′′ : V(pi, ti, y′′) − V(pj, tj, y′′) ≤ 0.
11 Moreover, property 2 would also hold if εh,yd < 1 and r
′(y) = 0.
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From the continuity ofV in y follows the continuity ofV(pi, ti,y) − V(pj, tj,y)
in y. The intermediate-value theorem then proves that there is at least one yˆ
between y′ and y′′ such that V(pi, ti, yˆ) − V(pj, tj, yˆ) = 0. 
Proposition 2 (Income segregation) If both communities are populated and if
(p1, t1) = (p2, t2) with t1 > t2, then any household in community 2 is richer than the
border household and any household in community 1 is poorer than the border
household.
Proof. The proof uses figure 1, which shows the indifference curves in the
(t, p) plane for three different income levels y′ < yˆ < y′′. The indifference
curves represent all (t, p) combinations that households consider as good as
community 1’s (p1, t1) pair. Each household prefers pairs south-west of its
indifference curve. It follows from property 1 that the indifference curves
decrease in the (t, p) plane, and from property 2 that they become flatter
as income rises. Imagine now a community 2, characterized by t2 < t1 and
p2 > p1, where household yˆ is indifferent to 1. All poorer households, e.g., y′,
prefer 1 to 2, and all richer households, e.g., y′′, prefer 2 to 1. 
Figure 1
Indifference Curves in the (t, p) Plane
3.3. Equilibrium
An equilibrium requires that each household be located in the community
that maximizes its utility, that local housing markets clear, that each commu-
nity has a balanced public budget, and that each community has a positive
population.
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There always exists a symmetric equilibrium in which both communities
have the same characteristics, i.e., (p1, t1) = (p2, t2), and in which the house-
holds allocate themselves so that all communities show the same income
distribution.12 The following proposition shows that an asymmetric equilib-
rium, i.e., an equilibrium in which (p1, t1) = (p2, t2), can exist as well. In
addition, we assume:13
(i) The housing supplyHS(Li,pi) is positive at price zero:HS(Li,0) = Li > 0
for i = 1, 2.
(ii) There is a minimum income y > g.
(iii) There is no upper bound on utility from housing consumption: hi → ∞,
bi > 0, hj < ∞, and bj < ∞ implies U(hi, bi) > U(hj, bj).
Proposition 3 (Existence of an asymmetric equilibrium) Given the additional as-
sumptions (i) to (iii), there exists an equilibrium in which the communities 1 and 2
exhibit different characteristics, i.e., (p1, t1) = (p2, t2).
The proof is given in appendix 7.1.
3.4. Adding Heterogeneous Preferences
So far, we have assumed that households differ in their incomes y only. This
has led to perfect income sorting,which is a veryunrealistic prediction. In this
section, we extend the model by assuming that the households’ preferences
are also heterogeneous, which will lead to imperfect income sorting.
The household preferences are now represented by the utility function
U(h, b; α), where the parameter α describes the taste for housing. The
higherα, themore a household is, ceteris paribus, willing to spend on housing.
Hence, the housing demand increases in α, i.e.,
∂h∗
∂α
= ∂h(t, p; y, α)
∂α
> 0 for all t, p, y, and α. (7)
We assume that h∗ is continuous in α, and that preferences are distributed
independently of income with density function f (α) > 0 for α ∈ [α, α].
It follows that perfect income segregation still holds, but only within the
subpopulation of households with identical preferences α and if both com-
munities are populated by households with preferences α. In addition to
segregation by incomes, there is segregation by preferences:
Lemma 2 (Boundary indifference with heterogeneous preferences) Consider a sub-
population of households with identical income y. If a household with taste α′ pre-
12 Other equilibria in which (p1, t1) = (p2, t2) may exist as well.
13 As it will become evident in section 4, these assumptions are sufficient, but not necessary,
for the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium.
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fers to live in community i and a household with taste α′′ > α′ in community j, then
there exists a border household with taste αˆ(y), α′ ≤ αˆ(y) ≤ α′′, that is indifferent be-
tween the two communities.
Theproof is analogous to theproofof lemma1.The continuity ofV(pi, ti,y,α)
−V(pj, tj, y, α) in α follows from the continuity of h∗ in α.
Proposition 4 (Preference segregation) If both communities are populated by
households with income y and if (p1, t1) = (p2, t2) with t1 > t2, then among the sub-
population of households with identical income y, any household in community 1
has a stronger taste for housing than the border household, and any household in
community 2 has a weaker taste for housing, than the border household.
The proof is analogous to the proof of proposition 2, using ∂M/∂α =
−(∂h∗/∂α) / [y r(y)] < 0 as counterpart to property 2.
Corollary 1 The locus of border households αˆ(y) is strictly increasing in y.
Proof. Suppose αˆ(y) is non-increasing at some border household (y˜, α˜ =
αˆ(y˜)). Then there exists a border household with y′ > y˜ and α′ = αˆ(y′) ≤ α˜.
Proposition 4 implies that all households with y′ and α ≥ α′ weakly prefer
community 1. The household with y′ and α˜ therefore weakly prefers commu-
nity 1. However, proposition 2 implies that all households with α˜ and y > y˜,
including (y′,α˜), strictly prefer community 2. This is a contradiction. 
Simultaneous heterogeneity in incomes and tastes leads to amore realistic
patternof household segregation. Figure 2 shows the locus of households that
are indifferent between communities 1 and 2. Community 1 with a high tax
Figure 2
Simultaneous Income and Preference Segregation
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multiplier t1 and low housing prices p1 is populated by households that are
relatively poor or that have a relatively strong taste for housing.Community 2
with t2 < t1 and p2 > p1 is populated by households that are relatively rich or
that have a relatively weak taste for housing. Hence, even though income
segregation is no longer perfect, income groups still tend to gather.
Proposition 4 and Lemma 2 allow us to calculate the probability that
a household with income y lives in community 1,
P(1|y) =
∫ ∞
αˆ(y)
f (α)dα = 1 − F(αˆ(y)) , (8)
where F(·) denotes the cdf of the preference parameter α. The following
lemma shows that this probability decreases in y:
Lemma 3 (Population shares by income) If both communities are populated and
if (p1, t1) = (p2, t2) with t1 > t2, then the probability that a household with income y
lives in community 1 is weakly decreasing in y for all y and strictly decreasing in y
for some y.
Proof. Equation (8) implies ∂P(1|y)/∂y = −∂F(αˆ(y))/∂y = −[∂F(αˆ(y))/
∂αˆ(y)] · [∂αˆ(y)/∂y], and corollary 1 implies ∂αˆ(y)/∂y > 0. Since f (α) ≥ 0
for all α, it holds for all y that ∂F(αˆ(y))/∂αˆ(y) ≥ 0 and, consequently, that
∂P(1|y)/∂y ≤ 0. The border household αˆ(y) exists, i.e., f (αˆ(y)) > 0, at least
for some y, as otherwise one community would not be populated. Therefore
∂F(αˆ(y))/∂αˆ(y) > 0 and ∂P(1|y)/∂y > 0 for some y. 
3.5. Tax Progression
In this section, we derive how the described equilibrium sorting of the pop-
ulation affects the liability progression of the tax schedule.
Recall that the average tax rate a household faces depends on the tax
multiplier ti of the community he locates in. We introduce the concept of the
mean average tax rate to describe the expected average tax rate a household
faces in equilibrium unconditional on his location:
E[t r(y)|y] =
∑
i=1,2
[P(i|y) ti] r(y) = {P(1|y) t1 + [1 − P(1|y)] t2}r(y) . (9)
Hence, a household with income y pays in equilibrium on average total taxes
equal to E[T(y)|y] = E[t r(y)|y]y. The liability progression of the mean tax
schedule is thus
ρ∗(y) := ∂E[T(y)|y]
∂y
y
E[T(y)|y] =
r(y) + yr′(y)
r(y)
(10)
+ [∂P(1|y)/∂y] (t1 − t2) y
P(1|y) t1 + [1 − P(1|y)] t2 .
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Proposition 5 (Tax progression in equilibrium) If both communities are populated
and if (p1, t1) = (p2, t2) with t1 > t2, then the liability progression of the mean tax
schedule is weakly lower than the liability progression of the tax schedule in each
community for all incomes y and strictly lower for some incomes y.
Proof. The first addend of equation (10) equals the liability progression in
any given community as defined in equation (1). The second addend is thus
the difference between the liability progression of the mean tax schedule
and the liability progression in any community. Since t1 > t2, this difference
is weakly negative if ∂P(1|y)/∂y ≤ 0, and strictly negative if ∂P(1|y)/∂y < 0.
Lemma 3 completes the proof. 
4.A Specified Version of the Model
We investigate the qualitative and quantitative properties of the model in
a fully specified example in this section. The specification is kept as simple
as possible but still captures all mechanisms of the model. The example is
calibrated to the Zurich area, the largest Swiss metropolitan area.
The tax schedule is taken from Young (1990):
r(y) = r0
{
1 − [1 + r2 (y − d)r1]−1/r1}
withparameters r0 > 0, r1 > 0, and r2 > 0. In addition toYoung,we also include
a deductible d > 0. The average local tax rate t r(y) and the local marginal tax
rate t[yt ∂r(y)/∂y + r(y)] are increasing in income y. The marginal tax rate is
above the average tax rate for all incomes exceeding the deductible d, and
both asymptotically approach a maximum t r0.
Household preferences are described by a Cobb–Douglas utility function:
U = hα b1−α ,
where 0 < α < 1 stands for the taste parameter of the general model. Utility
function and tax schedule satisfy properties 1 and 2.
We adopt the housing supply function
HSi = Li(pi)θ
from Epple and Romer (1991).14
We calibrate the above outlined model to the Zurich metropolitan area,
the largestmetropolitan area in Switzerland. The city ofZurich has about 330
thousand inhabitants and is the capital of the canton (state) of Zurich. The
canton of Zurich counts 1.2 million inhabitants in 171 individual communi-
ties. As described in section 2, each of these communities can choose its own
14 Epple and Romer derive this housing supply function from an explicit production func-
tion, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 is the ratio of non-land to land input.
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tax multiplier. We restrict the analysis to the city of Zurich and a ring of the
most integrated communities around the center.15 This agglomeration of 41
communities is modeled in a highly stylized way as two distinct jurisdictions
with equal land size. We refer to these two communities as the low-tax and
the high-tax community, respectively.
The details of the calibration are described in the appendix 7.2 and sum-
marized at the bottom of table 1. Figure 3 shows the local tax multipliers
(left map) and the spatial income distribution (right map) in the calibrated
area.16
Figure 3
Taxes and Incomes in the Zurich Metropolitan Area
Local income tax multiplier (1997) Share of households with income
above CHF 75’000 (1997/98)
4.1. Simulated Equilibrium
The equilibrium values pi and ti in both communities satisfy equations (11)
and (12) and guarantee that no household wants to move. As there is
no closed-form solution to this nonlinear system of four equations and
15 This ring is formed by all communities in the canton of Zurich with more than 1/3 of the
working population commuting to the center. The number of commuters to the city of
Zurich and the size of the working population in the communities are based on the 1990
Census. This definition of the urban area is chosen to justify the model assumption that
the households’ income is exogenous, i.e., that they choose their place of residence in-
dependently of where they work. It results in a set of communities closest to the central
business district.
16 Data from the following sources: Housing prices: Wüest & Partner, Zürich. Tax rates:
Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zürich, Steuerfüsse 1997. Income distribution: Swiss Fed-
eral Tax Administration. Considered are all communities where more than 1/3 of the
working population is commuting to the center community.
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Table 1
Equilibrium Values of the Specified Model
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Model simulation Data metropolitan area of Zurich
High-tax Low-tax Unified High-taxa Low-taxb Whole
L: area 0.50 0.50 1 0.496 0.504 1
p: rent 10.2 12.2 11.3 233c, 204d 228c 232c
t: tax shifter 2.11 0.63 0.86 1.19–1.31 0.85–1.15 0.85–1.31
n: inhabitants 0.38 0.62 1 0.650 0.350 1
Ey: mean income 43,829 84,039 68,656 61,700 76,553 68,656
The calibrated model parameters: g = 2500, E(lny) = 11.0, SD(lny) = 0.517, ymin = 15300,
ymax = 500 000, E(α) = 0.25, S.A.(α) = 0.11, θ = 3, r0 = 0.2, r1 = 0.5, and r2 = 0.00065.
a 9 communities with highest taxes, b 32 communities with lowest taxes, c population
weighted mean, d mean excluding the city of Zurich.
four unknowns, we solve numerically for the equilibrium values of the
model.17
Table 1 shows in columns 1 and 2 the equilibrium values of the simu-
lated model with heterogeneous tastes. There are substantial differences in
mean incomes, taxes, and housing prices between the two communities: The
high-tax community exhibits about three times higher taxes and about 15%
lower housing prices than the low-tax community. The left graph in figure 4
shows the segregation pattern in the income–taste plane. The population is
imperfectly sorted by incomes. While most rich households are found in the
low-tax community, some rich households with a strong taste for housing
prefer the high-tax low-price community, and poor households with a low
taste for housing prefer the low-tax high-price community. The right graph
in figure 4 shows the resulting income distributions in the two communities.
The mean income in the high-tax community is now slightly more than half
the one in the low-tax community. Column 3 in table 1 gives the equilib-
rium values for the hypothetical case that the two communities merged or
harmonized their taxes.
The last three columns in table 1 report the actual housing rents, tax mul-
tipliers, andmean income for three sets of communities: Column 4 shows the
values for the 9 communities with highest taxes, and column 5 for the 32 com-
munities with lowest taxes. Note that these two groups have equal land area
17 The aggregation of individual behavior requires double integrals over the community
population. These integrals cannot be calculated analytically. We use Gauss–Legendre
quadrature with 40 nodes in each dimension to approximate the various double integrals.
We numerically solve for the equilibrium values by minimizing the sum of squared devi-
ations from the equilibrium conditions with the Gauss–Newton method.
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Figure 4
Income and Taste Segregation in Equilibrium
The left figure shows the preferred community for all household types. The right figure
shows the resulting income distributions in both communities.
dedicated to development. Column 6 shows averages for the whole metro
area. A comparison of our simulation results with the actual data shows that
our simple two-community model correctly predicts that rich households
tend to live in low-tax communities. The striking relationship between in-
come taxation and spatial income distribution can also be seen by comparing
the two maps in figure 3. The predicted higher housing prices in the low-tax
communities are supported by the data when the city of Zurich is excluded.18
The predicted magnitude of the differences is much higher than observed.
This is not unexpected, as our theoreticalmodel abstracts from the horizontal
and vertical tax equalization programs in Zurich (see section 2). Imperfect
tax equalization reduces the magnitude of tax and price differentials across
communities. Note, however, that the order of community characteristics
found in proposition 1 remains unchanged. Imperfect tax equalization does
not change the sorting mechanism in the model as long as (substantial) tax
and price differentials remain.
4.2. The Resulting Tax Schedule
The average tax rate ti r(y) depends not only on the individual household’s
income but also on its place of residence. The left panel in figure 5 shows
18 The city of Zurich is the central business district (CBD), where both housing prices and
taxes are relatively high. This is most likely due to the center’s intrinsic attractiveness
(e.g., its cultural life and low commuting costs), which is not captured in our model.
Multi-community models usually abstract from geography, i.e., physical distance, and ex-
clude the CBD in the empirical test (see, e.g., Epple and Sieg, 1999).
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Figure 5
Average Tax Rate (left) and Liability Progression (right) by Income
the average tax rate in the high-tax and in the low-tax community of our
specified model. The right panel in figure 5 shows the liability progression
of the tax schedules in each community. As shown before, liability progres-
sion is independent of the tax multiplier and therefore equal in the two
communities.
The place of residence is not random, and rich households are more likely
to reside in low-tax communities. The mean average tax rate E[t r(y)|y] as
defined in equation (9) describes the tax schedule that is realized after con-
sidering the sorting of the population. In other words, it gives the tax rate
a household with income y pays on average. The left panel in figure 5 also
shows the mean average tax rate. For very poor households the mean tax
schedule follows the one in the high-tax community, while for very rich
households it follows the one in the low-tax community. Middle-income
households face average tax rates in between. The resulting liability progres-
sion is shown in the right panel in figure 5. The mean tax schedule follows the
liability progression of each community’s tax schedule for very poor and very
rich household, but is substantially lower for middle-income households. For
some middle incomes, liability progression is even below 1, indicating that
the mean tax schedule is regressive.
5. Evidence
In this section, we estimate the mean average tax rates that households with
a given income face in the Zurich metropolitan area, as well as the liability
progression of the mean tax schedule. We then compare our estimates with
the results obtained in the previous section.
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5.1.Method
In principle, the mean average tax rate can be estimated from a random
sample of households in the studied area. Knowing each household’s income
and community tax rate allows us to directly estimate the mean average
tax rate with, e.g., a kernel regression. The random sampling automatically
allows for the sorting of the population by incomes. Unfortunately, we do
not have suchmicrodatawith tax information. Furthermore, available survey
data suffers from small sample sizes and stratified sampling over commu-
nities.
We therefore follow an alternative estimation strategy. The mean average
tax rate of a household with income y can be estimated from equation (9):
Eˆ[t r(y)|y] =
∑
i
Pˆ(i|y) · ti r(y) .
As the canton sets the tax schedule r(y) and the individual communities
their tax multipliers ti, the average tax rate tir(y) for any income y in any
community i is known.
The estimated probability that a household with income y lives in com-
munity i can be expressed as function of the overall income distribution f (y);
the income distribution in each community, f (y|i); and the population share
of each community, P(i):
Pˆ(i|y) = fˆ (y|i)Pˆ(i)
fˆ (y)
= fˆ (y|i)ni∑
j
[
fˆ (y|j)nj
] ,
where ni is the known number of households living in community i.
It remains, therefore, to estimate the income density fˆ (y|i) of each com-
munity i in the area. We estimate fˆ (y|i) from publicly available local income
distribution data. The federal tax administration publishes the number of
households with taxable income in seven different income classes.19 We as-
sume that incomes are log-normally distributed and estimate the mean and
variance of this distribution usingmaximum likelihood.20 We estimate a trun-
cated log-normal distribution, because the first reported income interval is
empty for technical reasons. The log likelihood function for any commu-
nity i is
log Li =
6∑
k=1
sk · log
[
Φ
( ck+1−µi
σi
)− Φ( ck−µiσi )
1 − Φ( c1−µiσi )
]
,
19 Swiss Federal Tax Administration, Steuerbelastung in der Schweiz, Natürliche Personen
nach Gemeinden 1997, Neuchâtel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
20 Note that this maximum-likelihood estimator corresponds to an ordered probit with
known thresholds.
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where µi and σ2i are themean and variance of log income in community i, and
sk is the number of households in income class kwith lower interval limit ck ∈
{log(15000),log(20000),log(30000), log(40000),log(50000),log(75000),∞}.
Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. The income density in
community i is then estimated as
fˆ (y|i) = 1
σˆiy
√
2π
exp
[
−1
2
(
log y − µˆi
σˆi
)2]
.
5.2. Results and Discussion
The left panel in figure 6 shows the mean average tax rate in the Zurich
metropolitan area. The top line is the average tax rate tir(y) of households
living in the community with the highest tax multiplier ti. The bottom line
is the average tax rate of households in the community with the lowest
tax multiplier ti. The middle line is the estimated mean average tax rate
that households with income y face in this area, Eˆ[t r(y)|y]. As one can
see, the mean average tax rate is for poor households almost the one of the
highest-tax communities, which include the city of Zurich.21 This is, of course,
because most poor households live in high-tax communities. As households
become richer, they are more likely to live in low-tax communities. The
mean average tax rate for rich households is therefore closer to the one in
lowest-tax communities.
The liability progression of the tax schedule is shown in the right panel
in figure 6. Note that the canton of Zurich sets constant marginal tax rates
Figure 6
Estimated Average Tax Rate (left) and Liability Progression (right) by In-
come.
21 The tax multiplier is 131 in the highest-tax community and 130 in the city of Zurich.
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within 12 income intervals. At the interval limits, the average tax rate there-
fore shows kinks and the liability progression shows discontinuities. The lia-
bility progression is the same in each community. Considering the estimated
income sorting, the liability progression of the mean tax schedule is lower
than the one of each community. This applies in particular for households
with high incomes y.
The results from the estimation (figure 6) are qualitatively similar to the
predictions from the simulation of our model (figure 5). There are, though,
some noteworthy differences: First, the difference between the highest and
the lowest tax multiplier is in reality smaller than our simulation predicts.
A major reason is certainly the horizontal and vertical tax equalization pro-
grams in the canton of Zurich, which lower the tax differentials across com-
munities (see section 2). Moreover, public expenditures are not exactly the
same in all communities (as our model assumes). They are on average 10%
higher in the communities that constitute the low-tax community in our
simulation than in the communities that constitute the high-tax community.
Second, the mean average tax rates for very rich households remain in
reality above the average tax rates in the lowest-tax community, while they
approach the average tax rates in the low-tax community in our simulation.
The reason for this difference is that in reality not all very rich households
choose to live in the lowest-tax communities. In particular,manyhigh-income
households choose to live in the high-tax city of Zurich. We think the main
reason is that the location choice also depends on preferences beyond the
taste for housing. For example, residents in the city of Zurich might also
value its cultural life or low commuting costs.
Third, the difference between the liability progression of the mean tax
schedule and the liability progression of each community’s tax schedule
peaks in the estimation at a higher income than in our simulation. The
reason is that the share of rich households living in the high-tax community
is very small in our simulation, while it is substantial and thus more sensitive
to changes in income in the estimation.
6. Conclusions
This paper studies the tension between fiscal decentralization and progres-
sive taxation.Wepresent amulti-communitymodel inwhich the local income
tax rate depends on an exogenous progressive tax schedule and a tax multi-
plier that can differ across communities. The progression of the tax schedule
induces a self-sorting process that results in income sorting. This income
sorting is, however, imperfect if households differ in their preferences for
housing. But rich households are still more likely to locate themselves in
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communities with low tax multipliers than poor households are. As a conse-
quence, the mean tax schedule becomes less progressive than the exogenous
tax schedule. Empirical evidence from the largest Swiss metropolitan area,
the Zurich area, supports our predictions: Rich households are more likely
to live in communities with low tax multipliers than poor households, and
the mean tax schedule is thus less progressive than the tax schedule of the
canton of Zurich.
These findings suggest, in line with the literature on fiscal federalism,
that progressive taxes should indeed be implemented at the state or national
level if one wants them to display their full redistributive effect. But they also
show that substantial redistribution through progressive income taxation is
possible even at the community level.
7.Appendix
7.1. Proof of Proposition 3
We define ∆V(yˆ) := V1(p1(yˆ), t1(yˆ), yˆ) − V2(p2(yˆ), t2(yˆ), yˆ), where pi(yˆ) and
ti(yˆ) are the equilibrium housing price and the equilibrium tax multiplier,
respectively, in i given that households with y < yˆ live in 1 and households
with y > yˆ in 2. (Remember from proposition 2 that any household in 2 must
be richer than any household in 1.) Hence, Vi(pi(yˆ), ti(yˆ), yˆ) is the indirect
utility of a household with yˆ in i given this allocation of households.
We prove proposition 3 by showing (1) that ∆V(yˆ) is continuous and (2)
that ∆V(yˆ) > 0 as yˆ → y and that ∆V(yˆ) < 0 as yˆ → y. It follows then from
the intermediate-value theorem that there is at least one yˆ, y < yˆ < y, such
that ∆V(yˆ) = 0. This implies – from the definition of ∆V – that house-
holds with yˆ are indifferent between the two communities, that p1 and
p2 clear the housing markets, and that t1 and t2 balance the community
budgets.
(1): In equilibrium, pi is determined by HS(Li,pi) = HDi. It follows from
proposition 2 that
HDi =
∫ yi
y
i
h(pi, ti; y)f (y)dy , (11)
where y
i
and yi are the highest and lowest incomes in i. The thereby implicitly
defined pi is continuous in yi and yi, given continuity of HS(·), h(·), and f (·).
The balanced-budget requirement and proposition 2 imply
ti = nig∫ yi
y
i
r(y)f (y)dy
, (12)
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where
ni =
∫ yi
y
i
f (y)dy . (13)
Given continuity of r(·) and f (·), ti is continuous in yi and yi. Since Vi is
continuous in pi, ti, and y and since pi and ti are continuous in y, ∆V(yˆ) is
continuous in yˆ.
(2): It follows from equations (11) and (13) that HD1 → 0 and n1 → 0 as
yˆ → y. Since assumption (i) guarantees that HS(L1, 0) = L1 > 0 [and since
∂HS(Li, pi)/∂pi ≥ 0], it holds that h∗(p1, t1; y) → ∞ and p1 → 0 as yˆ → y.
Hence, b∗ → y − g > 0, where the strict inequality follows from assump-
tion (ii). Assumption (iii) then guarantees that ∆V(yˆ) > 0 as yˆ → y. Analo-
gously, it can be shown that ∆V(yˆ) < 0 as yˆ → y.22 
7.2. Calibration
Tax schedule: The parameters r0 = 0.2, r1 = 0.5, and r2 = 0.00065 closely
approximate the tax scheme of the canton of Zurich for a married couple.
The deductible d = 15 300 is based on a family with one child.23
Income Distribution:The income distribution is calibrated with data from
the Swiss Federal Tax Administration. We use a log-normal distribution
to approximate this right-skewed distribution. The estimation of the mean
E(ln y) = 11.0 and standard deviation SD(ln y) = 0.517 from the observed
income bins is described in the empirical section 5.1. For numerical tractabil-
ity, the model distribution is truncated at a minimum income equal to the
deductible ymin = 15 300 and a maximum income ymax = 500 000.
Taste Distribution: The distribution of the taste for housing is calibrated
with data from the Swiss labor-force survey.24 The Swiss labor-force survey
contains the monthly housing expenditure of renters.25 Note that the taste
parameter α in the Cobb–Douglas utility function is the share of housing
in a utility-maximizing household. We therefore estimate each household
taste parameter as α = (ph)/yd, where ph is the observed households hous-
ing expenditure and yd is the observed household income minus federal,
state, and communal taxes. A beta distribution with mean E(α) = 0.25 and
standard deviation SD(α) = 0.11 describes the distribution of the so cal-
culated taste parameter well. Taste and income are assumed to be uncor-
related.
22 The only difference is that b∗ → y − g, which exceeds y − g.
23 Tax scheme according to Steuergesetz vom 8. Juni 1997, Tarif a.
24 Swiss Federal Statistical Office, Schweizerische Arbeitskräfterhebung (SAKE) 1995.
25 Of course, there is a selection bias by only considering renters. This seems nevertheless
justified because the proportion of renters is very high in Switzerland (65% in the data set
used).
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Housing andPublic-Good Production:The price elasticity of housing sup-
ply is θ = 3, as in Epple and Romer (1991) and Goodspeed (1989). The tar-
geted public-good provision g = 2500 is such that the (population-)weighted
average tax multiplier in the calibrated model with heterogeneous tastes
equals the observed one.
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